

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

## DISTRICT OF NEVADA

\* \* \*

ANTHONY RAY PRICE,

v.

Plaintiff,

STATE OF NEVADA, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:23-cv-00574-MMD-CSD

ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony Ray Price brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Washoe County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On September 11, 2024, this Court ordered Price to update his address by October 10, 2024. (ECF No. 21.) That deadline expired without an updated address from Price, and his mail from the Court is being returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 22.)

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy

1 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic  
2 alternatives. See *In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th  
3 Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone*, 833 F.2d at 130).

4 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation  
5 and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Price's  
6 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal  
7 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing  
8 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542  
9 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of  
10 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

11 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can  
12 be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the Court's need to consider  
13 dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining  
14 that considering less drastic alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order  
15 does not satisfy this factor); *accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th  
16 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that  
17 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s  
18 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled  
19 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by *Yourish*).  
20 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a  
21 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779  
22 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without  
23 the ability for the Court and Defendants to send Price case-related documents, filings,  
24 and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But  
25 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach Price  
26 is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the  
27 Court's finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given  
28 these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.

Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Price's failure to file an updated address in compliance with this Court's order from September 11, 2024. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Price wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide the Court with his current address.

It is further ordered that Price's motions for various relief (ECF Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20) are denied as moot.

It is further ordered that Price's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is denied as moot.

DATED THIS 21<sup>st</sup> Day of October 2024.



MIRANDA M. DU  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE